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STATEMENT OF CASE
1.

This is a probate case.

2.

Milo Riming "Milo" , a single man, died on February 23, 2015, at the

years. R.

p. 11.
3.

Milo had been married twice, first to Doris White, and secondly to Mary, from whom he
was divorced at the time of his passing. R. p. 15.

4.

Milo had three children from his first marriage, Jodi Riming "Jodi", Cindy Louise Uzzle,
"Cindy", and Vicki Dian Berryman, "Vicki". In addition Milo had one step-child from
his first marriage, John White "John". All four are named as devisees under Milo's will.
R. p. 15, 17.

5.

Milo had no children from his second marriage, though Mary previously had two
children, Rodney Jacobs, "Rodney", and Debi Sanders, "Debi", neither of whom were
adopted by Milo. Both are named as devisees in Milo's will. R. p. 15, 17.

6.

Milo was a mechanic all of his adult life, and his personal property reflected that
avocation. Tr. p. 20, L. 9-18/8, p. 252, L. 15-20/66.

7.

Milo's estate was not large, consisting of a modest mobile home situate on twelve rural
acres, a modest bank account which secured a loan of nearly equivalent value, and several
older vehicles, vehicle parts, tools, equipment, household furnishings and personal
effects. R. p. 60-61; Tr. P. 141, L. 2-6/39.
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8.

Milo's will provided for all ~ix devisees, though John was to receive only a half share. R.
p. 17.

9.

Milo selected two Personal Representatives, one a natural child, Vicki, and the other
Mary's son Rodney, both of whom are the Respondents in this appeal, and who will be
referred to hereafter as "Vicki and Rodney''. R. p. 15.

10.

Vicki resides in Phoenix, Arizona, Tr. p. 179, L. 10-11/48 and Rodney resides in
Pullman, Washington. Tr. p. 136, L. 16-19/37.

11.

Milo's will also provided a potential Specific Bequest to his step-son, Rodney, who was
provided with an option to purchase his residence and acreage for ten thousand dollars
($10,000) less than the appraisal price of the property. R. p. 17.

12.

Lastly, Milo's will provided a mechanism for "auction ing" the personal property, giving
preference to the devisees named above. R. p. 16. The material portion is quoted:
To the extent not disposed ofby a written statement or list
provide d in the preceding sub-paragraph, and in the event any of
the family members listed in Article I desire to purchase said
property, my Co-Personal Representatives are authorized to sell
such property to any heir, with the proceeds of such sale to be
added to the residue of my Estate. If more than one of said family
member s desire to purchase said property, my Co-Personal
Representatives are authorized to conduct a 'family auction' of
such items, with my family member s being authorized to bid. All
items shall be sold for a cash price, the proceeds of which shall be
added to the residue of my Estate.

R. p. 16.
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13.

On March 10, 2015, Vicki and Rodney filed an Application for Informal Probate of
Milo's will and Appoin tment of Co-Personal Representatives. R. p. 11-14.

14.

On March 11, 2015, John filed a Motion to Substitute Co-Personal Representative. R. p.
25-26.

15.

Confronted with the question as to who should be appointed as Personal Representative,
Vicky and Rodney responded on March 17, 2015, by filing a Petition for Formal Probate,
seeking a court determination to determine who would be appointed as Personal
Representatives as well as a determination that Milo's will was validly executed and
enforceable as such. R. p. 31-35.

16.

On April 6, 2015, a contested hearing was conducted to determine who would be
appointed as Personal Representatives. R. p. 68.

17.

Debi, the other devisee under Milo's will, did not object and throughout this protracted
litigation has essentially been a non-participant in the entire probate.

18.

Magistrate Hansen denied John's Motion, and formally appointed Vicki and Rodney as
Co-Personal Representatives on April 13, 2015. R. p. 47-49.

19.

Vicki and Rodney thereafter informally agreed to divide the responsibilities of Personal
Representative, with Rodney assumin g primary responsibility for keeping track of the
financial issues, and Vicki assumin g responsibility for "auction " arrangements and
disposition of the real property. Tr. p. 27, L. 6-8/10; Tr. p. 135, L. 5-7/37.
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20.

An appraisal of the real property was obtained, resulting in an appraised valuation of
$72,500 for the property; Ex. D, R. p. 228-243. The property was not immediately listed
for sale, as Rodney had the option, pursuant to Milo's will, to purchase the property for
the appraisal price less a ten thousand dollar discount, or $62,500, the option expiring on
February 23rd, 2016, one year after Milo's passing. R. p. 17.

21.

The devisees agreed, in writing, to alter the method of disposition of the personal
property. They agreed to divide what might be called family memorab ilia between the six
devisees without an auction, but rather by lot. Tr. p. 26, L. 22-p. 27, L. 4/10. Exhibit 1,
R. p. 116-121.

22.

The division of family memorab ilia and the auction were held on March 10, 2015, with
each item being inventoried on a list together with the name of the purchaser and the
purchase price, after which a copy of the list was provided to each of the devisees on the
same date, less than a month after the appointm ent of Vicki and Rodney. The list is
twelve pages long, and is part of Exhibit B, Schedule A. R. p. 195-p. 221.

23.

The Personal Representatives proceede d to conduct an auction Qf the balance of the
personal property, primarily older vehicles, titled and non-titled, automobile parts, tools
and equipment, as instructed in Milo's will. R. p. 16.

24.

Rodney's option to purchase the real property expired one year after Milo's passing, on
February 23, 2016, as a result of which Vicki and Rodney listed the property for sale with
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Mark Call, a local realtor, in late March or early April, 2016. Tr. p. 182, L. 14- p. 183, L.
20/49.
25.

Charlie Bair made an offer of $50,000 "right away'' after the property was listed; the offer
was rejected by Rodney and Vicki in order to give them more time to market the property
and obtain a higher offer. Tr. p. 189, L. 25-p. 190, L. 25/51.

26.

Mark Call received three offers, apparently all contingent on financing, though the record
is not clear as to whether an earnest money agreemen t was ever signed. Tr. p. 188, L 1-9/50.

27.

Mark Call received an offer to purchase from John White, Jr. for either $65,000 or
$73,000. (Tr. p. 188, L. 10-25), which offer was contingent on arranging FHA financing.
See R. p. 53; Tr. p. 203, L. 4-7/54.

28.

John was unable to obtain financing, though no admissible evidence was offered to
explain why he was unable to purchase the property. Tr. p. 197, L. 21-p. 202, L.15/53-54; Tr. p. 216, L. 3- p. 220, L. 4/57--58.

29.

Sometim e in August, 2016, approximately four months after the property was initially
listed with the realtor, Charlie Bair renewed his $50,000 offer, which was not contingent
on financing, which was accepted by Vicki and Rodney. Tr. p. 190, L. 3--5/51.

30.

On January 17, 2017, Vicki and Rodney prepared a Final Accounting, and filed a Petition
for Order Approvin g Final Settlement, serving all devisees with copies. R. p. 55-61.
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31.

An initial hearing on the Petition for Order Approving Final Settlement was schedu
led for
February 6, 2017. R. p. 64-65.

32.

In response on February 6, 2017 John filed an Objection to Final Accounting
and made a
Request for more Detailed Information, identifying four specific issues. R. p.
69-71.

33.

The hearing scheduled for February 6, 2017 was continued until March 27, 2017,
in part
to provide John with time to review the accounting documents. R. p. 104-105.

34.

On March 6, 2017, twenty one days prior to the hearing, Vicki and Rodney submit
ted a
formal Response to Objection to Final Accounting and Request for more Detaile
d
Information, which included 25 pages of financial records, including bank accoun
t
records. R. p. 76-101.

35.

On March 27, 2017 Magistrate Hansen initiated the hearing at 10:03 AM by noting
the
time available for the hearing, and required all parties to conclude the evidenc
e by 3 :30
PM. Tr. p. 180, L.3-5/41; p. 224, L3/59; p. 292, L. 18-222/76.

36.

John through his attorney at the time, Steven Blaser, called the following witness
es: R. p.

3.
a.

Rodne y Jacobs.

b.

Vicki Berryman

c.

John White, Jr.

d.

John White, Sr.
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e.
37.

Cindy Rimin g

One area of dispute addressed several items of personal property not sold

at the auction,

including an air tank (Tr. p. 210, L. 11-16/56), some handcarts (Tr. p.
211, L. 16-23/56; p.
212, L. 7-9/56) and some file cabinets (Tr. p. 211, L. 24-p. 212, L. 6/56).
Vicki later
responded that John should take anything left on the property which was

not sold. Tr. p.

249, L. 21-p. 252, L. 11 \66.
38.

Cindy, John and Jodi did not call Mark Call or Charlie Bair as witnes

ses, and sought no

relief during or after the hearing for any apparent failure to subpoena

or depose those

witnesses prior to the hearing.
39.

Magistrate Hansen did not exclude any witnesses, although he did requir
e the parties to
produce their evidence within the time available on the date of the hearin
g. Tr. p. 150, L
3-5/41, p. 224, L. 3-6/59.

40.

The hearing concluded at 3:38 PM on March 27, 2017, several minute

s beyond the time

set by Magistrate Hansen for the hearing to be concluded. Tr. p. 306,
L. 7/80.
41.

The Final Accounting set forth a claim for attorney's fees to be paid by
the estate of
$9000, Personal Representative fees for Vicki of $3364.56, and Person
al Representative
fees for Rodney of$32 95.60. The claim was supported by an itemized
billing introduced
into evidence as Exhibit C, Tr. p. 222-224/59.

42.

Magistrate Hanse n denied any relief relative to the sale of the home and
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acreage for the

reason that no expert testimony was offered to establish the fair market value of the home
sold, and therefore implicitly there was no basis for an award. Tr. p. 302, L. 15-19/79.
43.

Magistrate Hansen orally approved the final accountin g and distribution at the conclusio n
of the hearing on March 27, 2017. Tr. p. 305, L. 2-4/80.

44.

On April 10, 2017, Magistra te Hansen entered an Order Regardin g Final Accounting and
Schedule of Distribut ion, by which he approved the Personal Represen tative's Final
Accounting. R. p. 115-118.

45.

Additionally, both Vicki and Rodney submitted a claim for their travel and attendance at
the March 2th hearing, Exhibit C, which was approved by Magistrate Hansen in his
Order Approvin g Final Accounti ng, in the sum of$983.8 1 for Vicki and $1,118.70 for
Rodney. See R. p.116-11 7.

46.

On May 22, 2017, a Notice of Appeal was filed by Cindy, Jodi and John, 42 days after
entry of Judge Hansen's final Order, through their new attorneys Gregory C. May and
Kyle R .. May, members of the law firm of May, Rammell and Thompso n Chartered. R. p.
119-121.

47.

On March 29, 2018, ten months after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the Transcript
was lodged. R. p. 130-131.

48.

On Septembe r 13, 2018, after the parties complete d the briefing and arguments
addressing the issues on appeal from the Magistra te's Division to the District Court,
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District Judge Simpson ordered the case remanded to the Magistrate's Division, with
instructions to enter a Final Judgment which complied with the requirements ofl.R.C.P .
60. R. p. 202-204.
49.

On November 19, 2018, Magistrate Hansen entered a Final Judgment, which we will
refer to as "Judgme nt I," which contained a brief set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law. R. p. 205-206.

50.

On January 9, 2019 District Judge Simpson ruled "Judgment I" failed to comply with
I.R.C.P. 60 because it contained Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and remanded
the matter to Magistrate Hansen to enter a Judgment which did comply with said rule. R.
p. 207-209.

51.

On January 17, 2019 Magistrate Hansen entered an Amended Final Judgment, which we
will refer to as "Judgment II," and which contained more detailed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. R. p. 210-212.

52.

On January 31, 2019 Judge Simpson once again ruled "Judgme nt II" failed to comply
with I.R.C.P. 60 because it contained Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and he
therefore remanded the case to Magistrate Hansen one more time. R. p. 213-215.

53.

On February 19, 2019, Magistrate Hansen entered a Second Amended Final Judgment,
which we will refer to as "Judgme nt III", which has been treated as the "Final Judgment",
and which is the Judgment the District Judge considered in his decision. R. p. 216-217.
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54.

On April 19, 2019, District Judge Simpson entered his 41 page "Decision and Order on
Appeal," R. p. 218-259, in which he concluded as a matter of law that Magistrate Hansen
had not abused his discretion in (1) accepting the inventory, (2) excluding witnesses, (3)
concluding the sale of real property was reasonable, (4) concluding the management of
the real property was reasonable, and (5) concluding the auction of personal property was
reasonable; however Judge Simpson did conclude the failure to articulate findings and
conclusions with respect to Vicki and Rodney's reimbursement was an abuse of
discretion, and he therefore remanded the case to Magistrate Hansen. We note that Order
included a denial of Vicki and Rodney's claim for attorney's fees, basing his ruling on a
perceived failure of Rodney and Vicki to set forth the claim for fees in their responsive
briefing in the appeal to the District Court. R. p. 257.

55.

On April 30, 2019 Vicki and Rodney filed a petition for Re-Hearing which addressed
only Judge Simpson's ruling on the claim for attorney's fees incurred on the appeal to the
District Court, R. p. 260-263, citing the District Court to that portion of their briefing (R.
p. 176), which claimed attorney's fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 15-8-208.

56.

On August 22, 2019 the District Court entered an Order Granting Petition for Rehearing
and Granting Request for Attorney Fees and Costs based on Idaho Code§ 12-121. R. p.
287-290. -

57.

This appeal was triggered with the filing of a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme
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court on October 2, 2019. R. p. 304-308.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
The appeal should be dismissed for failure to cite th~ appropriate standard of review
on an
appeal from a district court's intermediate appellate decision.
CLAIM FOR ATTOR NEY FEES ON APPEAL
We assume the Persona l Representatives are entitled to be reimbursed by the Estate for their
expenses and disbursements, including attorney fees and costs they incur in this appeal,
under the
authority of Idaho Code § 15-3-702. We recogni ze any affected party has the right to contest
the
\

amount of those fees, which is not an issue presentl y before the court. Idaho Code § 15-3-72
1. We
assume the estate's obligation to pay its attorney fees is not an issue before the court, but raise

it only

to distinguish that issue from the cost shifting provisio n of Idaho Code § 12-121.
Vicki and Rodney as Personal Representatives claim the right to recover attorney fees and
costs incurred in this appeal from Jodi, Cindy and John pursuan t to Idaho Appellate Rule
41 and
Idaho Code § 12-121.
I. A. R. 41 requires the claim for Respond ents' attorney fees and costs to be set forth in
the
first appellate brief, as required by I. A. R. 3 5(b)(5).

We assume this paragraph satisfies that

requirement.
Idaho Code § 12-121 provide s in pertinen t part that "In any civil action, the judge may award
reasonable attorney 's fees when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or
defende d
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frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."
The Supreme Court requires a party seeking attorneys fees under Idaho Code § 12-121

to set

forth its basis for the claim. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Treasure Valley Seed, 164 Idaho
654,65 9,434
P.3d 1260 (2019). We have set forth the basis of the claim in the argument portion
of this brief
commencing at page 19.
ARGUMENT

I.

Standard of Review

A. The appeal from the Magistrate to the District Court was not conducted as a trial
but instead as an appeal based on the transcript, as provided by I.R.C.P. 83(a)(2

de novo,

), which was treated

procedurally by the District Court as required by I.R.C.P. 83(f)(l ).

B. When this Court reviews the decision of a district court sitting in its capacit
y as an
appellate court, the standard of review is as follows:
'The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to
support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's
conclusions oflaw follow from those findings. If those findings are
so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district
court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's
decision as a matter of procedure.' Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho
670,67 2, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008) (quoting Nicholls v. Blaser, 102
Idaho 559,56 1,633 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1981). Thus we do not review
the magistrate court's decisions. Rather we are 'procedurally bound
to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court.' State v. Korn,
148 Idaho 413, 415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n.1 (2009)." Bailey v.
Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,52 9,284 P. 3d 970 (2012). See also Papin v.
Papin, 166 Idaho 9, 12,454 P.3d 1092 (2019).
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, C. "We review questions oflaw such as statutory interpretation de novo. "
Dept. OfHealth

and Welfare v. McCormick, 153 Idaho 468,47 0,283 P.3d 785, 787 (2012).
D. "To determine if a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers whethe
court (1) perceived the issue as one ofdiscretion, (2) acted within the outer bounds

r the trial

of that discretion,

(3) acted consist ently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
before it, and (4)
reache d its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneb org v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 859, 864, 421
P.3d 187,195 (2018)." Matter ofEstate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457,48 0 432 P.3d
6 (2018).

II.

Additional Issues on Appea l
The appeal should be dismissed for f allure to cite the appropriate standa

rd of review

on an appeal from a district court's intermediate appellate decision.
The Supreme Court has addressed the failure of litigants to properly address
the different
Standard of Review initially identified and discussed in Losser v. Bradstreet,
145 Idaho 670, 672,
183 P .3d 758, 760 (2008) several times. This Court communicated its concern
in Pelayo v. Pelayo,
154 Idaho 855,85 9,303 P. 3d 214 (2013), warning "Litigants who fail to properl
y comprehend the
standard of review for an appeal from the district court should not assume that
this will always be
the case" referring to the Supreme Court's willingness to dismiss an appeal for

failure to apply the

correct standard of review, although in that case neither of the litigants correct
ly articulated the

Losser standard.
Appell ants' citations to authority under the Standard of Review portion of their
brief fail to
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cite any case decided after Losser, suggesting the analysis and argument does not contemp
late the
change in appellate law that case sets forth.
Lastly, in the Conclus ion portion of their Brief, Jodi, Cindy and John do not address
the
Suprem e Court's limited choice of being "proced urally bound to affirm or reverse the decision
s of
the district court", as enunciated in Pelayo, supra at p. 859. The remedies Appellants present
to the
Suprem e Court are not options on an appeal from the intermediate district court to the
Suprem e
Court under current law.
Accordingly, this may be an appropriate appeal to dismiss under the Pelayo, supra, authorit

III.

y.

Attorney's Fees on Appeal
We begin by noting that District Judge Simpso n awarded Vicki and Rodney attorney fees

in

the appeal from the Magistr ate's Court to District Court. R. p. 289. This appeal involves
the same
basic factual issues; there appear to be no legal issues addressing any statutory or case
law before
the court, with exceptio n of the claims for attorney fees.
Prior Suprem e Court cases have ruled appeals which raise no contested question oflaw,
only request the Suprem e Court to second guess a Magistrate or District Court's findings

but

of fact are

frivolous, and in some cases also unreasonable and without foundation. Pelayo, supra.
We submit
the appeal regarding the inventory and the accounting later discussed in detail at pages
25 to 30
involve no question of law and are only a renewed argument over the facts initially made
to and
rejected by the magistrate, rejected again by the district judge, and now made anew here.
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With respect to the evidentiary arguments about either excluding witnesses or conside
of questionable evidence about the sale of the real property or damages suffere

ration

d from the sale, we

discuss those issues in detail at pages 35 to 41 of this brief
We take the position the arguments referred to above form the basis of the claim

this appeal

was taken "frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation." J.C. § 12-121.
Magistrate Hansen 's dilemm a of choosing between starting over with no new
or different
anticipated evidence or ending the dispute was presented to the District Court, and

now is presented

to the Supreme Court. Pelayo, supra, instructs us that re-casting the argume
nt is "frivolous,
unreasonable and without foundation."
IV.

Respondents' Issues on Appeal
A.

Did the District Court err by citing an improperly drafted Judgment in holdin
g
that the Magistrate conducted findings of fact and conclusions of law which
the
Appellants' counsel did not have an opportunity to review or approve or even
an opportunity to brief the issue after the appeal was already conducted?

The issue raised here addresses mistakes in the preparation and service of
proposed
Judgments and Final Judgments, which at a minimum is embarrassing to this author.

To the extent

Appellants address the findings of fact and conclusions of law orally articula
ted by Magistrate
Hansen, we address those issues in response to the second issue raised by Appella
nts.
Prior to the May law firm substituting for the Blaser firm, our firm prepared a form

certificate

of mailing identifying each of the devisees, and noting that only John White had
appeared through
counsel (Steven Blaser); therefore Mr. Blaser was identified as a recipient on
the Certificate of
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Mailin g form as counse l for John. See R. p. 65, 67, 75, 79, 103, 105 and 118.
The first error occurre d after Mr. May substitu ted as counse l for John White,

and for the first

time appear ed as counse l for Jodi and Cindy. The author 's certificate of
mailing form was not
immed iately amend ed to identif y Mr. May as opposi ng counse l instead
of Mr. Blaser after the
Distric t Court on Septem ber 13, 2018 initiall y remand ed the matter to Magist
of an approp riate Final Judgm ent, R. P. 202-20 4.

rate Hansen for entry

Althou gh the record does not reflect what ·

occurre d, Magist rate Hansen appare ntly request ed our firm, Baker and
Harris, to prepare the
approp riate Final Judgme nt. We appare ntly prepare d the propos ed Final Judgm
ent which was sent
electro nically to the Court on Novem ber 16, 2018, togethe r with a copy of
the original Certific ate
of Mailin g identifi ed above, which was prepare d for the Clerk's signature. We
conced e it is a matter
of commo n courtesy, practic e, profess ional respons ibility, and probab le rule
when submit ting any
propos ed docum ent to a court for conside ration to timely provid e opposi ng

counse l with a draft of

such propos als, and we admit we have no record indicat ing we served the propos

ed Judgm ent on Mr.

May or his office.
The second error was appare ntly a mis-un derstan ding of the then new
electro nic filing
require ments, which were at the time not only new to our office, but to the Idaho
We electro nically submit ted the initial propos ed Judgm ent (Judgm ent I) to

State bar generally.

the court togethe r with

the draft of the clerk's certific ate of mailing for her to execute when she served
the execute d Final
Judgm ent on the parties. This commu nique is not a part of the record on appeal.
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Howev er, the draft

of the propose d certificate of mailing was the same form we had used during the trial
when Mr.
Blaser was counsel of record, and therefore the Final Judgme nt (Judgment I) when execute
d by the
magistrate was served on the opposing parties here and John's attorney Mr. Blaser, rather

than Mr.

May. R. p. 206. The record reflects the execute d Judgme nt was distributed on Novemb er
19, 2018.

R. p. 206. We have no basis to dispute Mr. May's assertion that he was not provided with
either a
copy ofpropose d Judgme nt I before it was executed, or a copy of the original Judgme nt I

after it was

signed, though two of his clients (Jodi and Cindy) were apparently served with the signed
Final
Judgiv,ent, as was Mr. Blaser, John White's former counsel. R. p. 206.
Unfortunately, a different error occurred after Judge Simpson remanded the Judgme nt
to
Magistrate Hansen a second time on January 9, 2019. The propose d Judgment (Judgme
nt II) was
again drafted by Mr. Baker, electronically submitted to the court but apparently not counsel
for
consideration, execute d by the Magistrate, and the Certificate of Mailing was signed by
the Clerk
and again erroneo usly served on Mr. Blaser for John, and on Cindy and Jodi rather
than their
attorney Mr. May. R. p. 212.
When the second Judgme nt was once again remanded to Magistrate Hansen, the propose
d
electronically mailed Judgme nt (Judgment III) again was not served on Mr. May; howeve

r the Final

Judgme nt (Judgme nt III) was served on him after it was executed. R. p. 217.
One of Mr. May's objections is that he was not given an opportunity to object to the content
of the second propose d Judgme nt (Judgment II), which District Judge Simpson cited in his
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decision.

See Appell ant's Brief at page 6. His objection raises the question as to whethe
r that portion of the
improperly drafted Judgment containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law had any
meaningful function notwithstanding the fact it was later amended. District Judge
Simpson refused
to accept Magistrate Hansen 's Judgment II because it contained Findings of Fact
of Law, contrary to the current requirements ofl.R. C.P. 60; nevertheless, Judge

and Conclusions

Simpson treated that

document as a part of Magistrate Hansen 's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law. R. p. 236, L.

4-6.
This raises the issue noted above: What is the relevance of Judgment II?
If Judgment II is considered by the Supreme Court to be an acceptable, althoug
h partial,
expression of Magistrate's Hansen 's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

as Judge Simpson

decided, was there reversible error for the failure to serve the proposal on
Mr. May prior to
submission to the District Court? Contrarily, if Judgment II is treated as a nullity
because it was
superceded with a separate, amended document (Judgment III), did Judge
Simpson commit
reversible error in relying upon it?
Judgment II contains an expression of Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw,

which is the

reason it was rejected as a Final Judgment a required by I.R.C.P. 60. When a court
prepares Findings
ofFact and Conclusions of Law, a copy ofany proposed document is not general
for review or comment prior to execution; rather the Court, having considered

ly served on counsel

the matters before it,

simply enters its findings and conclusions. To the extent the conten t of Judgm
ent II in this case
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contain s findings or conclusions, they are little more than a formal stateme nt of

Magistrate Hansen 's

inform al conclu ding remark s at the end of the second hearing. It is difficult to
identify any prejudice;
indeed , if Distric t Judge Simpso n's relianc e on the docum ent in the absence

of service on Mr. May

was error; we conten d it was hannle ss error.
Alternatively, if this court should decide District Judge Simpso n's reliance on
Judgm ent II was a nullity, then that portion of Judge Simpso n's Order should

the conten t of

be disregarded by the

Suprem e Court. Given the Suprem e Court's scope ofrevie w, the Court conside
rs, but is not bound
by, the interm ediate Distric t Court's decision; rather the Suprem e Court looks
to the Magist rate's
remain ing findings to determ ine if there is substantial and compe tent eviden
ce to support those
findings. Bailey, supra at 529. Accordingly, it may be appropriate for the Suprem
e Court to simply
disrega rd that portion of Judge Simpso n's decisio n at R. p. 236.
Ultimately, the resolut ion of the underly ing issues in this probate tu.ms
on Magistrate
Hansen 's rulings, and not on Judge Simpso n's. Accordingly, under this analysi
s Judge Simpso n's
relianc e on Judgm ent II should be conside red hannle ss error.
The issue dealing with the several drafts ofjudgme nts, while immen sely embarr

assing, is not

what the this case is fundam entally about, and any error should be conside
red as hannle ss, as the
oversights, while regrettable, did not materia lly prejudice the argument of Jodi,
Cindy and John.
In Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457(Ct. App. 1994),
while the Court of
Appeal s disappr oved of the failure of one party to provide appr<:>priate notice
of hearings, the court
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held the conduct to be harmless error for a party "who has no substantial defense", referring

to the

motions as to which inadequate notice was provided. Error is harmless if it does not affect
the
substantial rights of a party, a substantial right being one that potentially affects the outcome

of the

litigation. Fonseca v. Corral Agriculture, Inc., 156 Idaho 142, 321 P.3d 692 (2014).

B.

Did the District Court err in the findings of fact and law in affirming the
Magistrate's decision that the Co-Personal Representatives provided an
adequate inventory and accounting pursuant to the probate statutes regarding
the administration of the estate?

Judge Simpso n's Decision and Order on Appeal dedicated nearly 15 pages to reviewing the
invento ry and accounting evidence presented to Magistrate Hansen, or perhaps more accurate

ly, the

absence of reliable evidence offered, which formed the basis of Magistr ate's Hansen 's
oral and
written findings of fact and conclusions of law
Inventory. Jodi, Cindy and John's arguments relative to the inventory raise both the timing
of the preparation and distribution of the inventory as well as the adequacy of the inventor
Simpso n ruled the Appellants failed to preserve the timing issue on appeal, and therefore

y. Judge

dismissed

that portion of the appeal. R. p. 236-7. To the extent Jodi, Cindy and John raise the timing
issue
here, it should be disregarded under Judge Simpso n's ruling.
With respect to the adequacy of the Inventory, we note the inventory was prepared in two
different parts, as there were two separate events resulting in division of personal property

; the first

of which was a division of household "sentimental type items" by way of a lottery, or round
robin
drawing involving the six devisees. Tr. p. 17, L. 2-12/8. Each devisee had prepared a list
of items
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they wanted. Tr. p. 17, L. 6 top. 18, L. 24/8. John identified Exhibit 1, Tr. p. 114-126, as the list of
the "sentimental" items which were divided by lottery. Tr. p. 26, L. 24-p. 27 L. 23/10.

John

admitted that all of the items addressed in the so-called family items were identified in the Inventory
list and "accepted" by everyone. Tr. p. 30, L. 2-5/11. District Judge Simpson addressed the conduct
of the first portion of the family "auction," including the signed acknowledgments of the devisees
(including Jodi, Cindy and John) on the list of items, or inventory, provided to them. R. p. 238,
Exhibit 1, R. p. 114-126. Judge Simpson's Order with respect to this issue should be affirmed.
The second event, the auction, was dictated by Milo's will, the pertinent paragraph being
quoted above in Paragraph 12 of the Statement of the Case portion of this brief. By limiting the
bidders to family members, Milo's intent was to benefit his devisees, as opposed to raising the
maximum amount of money from the sale of personal property. Pursuant to Milo's will, the family
auction was intended to dispose of all remaining personal property. R. p. 16. An Inventory, or list,
12 pages long, of all that property was prepared and a typed version marked as Exhibit B, Schedule
B, and was admitted into evidence at the March 27~ 2017 hearing. Tr. p. 280, L. 25-p. 281, L. 1/68.
We concede Idaho Code§ 15-3-706 requires the Personal Representatives to prepare and deliver to
the devisees an Inventory within ninety days after their appointment, and we concede that list was
not timely prepared or delivered to the devisees. However, the handwritten listing identified as
ExhibitB, ScheduleB , was a list of every item which was sold at the auction. Tr. p. 258, L. 4-12/68.
No significant prejudice has been shown by the delayed preparation and distribution of that listing,
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as all of the participants had knowledge of those items, as well as the successful purchas
er and the
price paid. We also note, as did District Judge Simpson, that no objection was made to the
lateness
of the disclo~ure of the inventory until raised in the initial appeal. R. p. 236-23 7. Issues may
not be
raised for the first time on appeal. Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99, 106 P.3d 425 (2005).
The remedy sought by Appellants is not clear; the comments to Idaho Code § 15-3-70
6
which require the filing or service of the Inventory within ninety days' of appointment
pose two
alternatives, one of which is a request for removal of the Personal Representatives, and the

second

of which is a claim against the personal representative for financial losses incurred as a result

of the

delay in the filing. Neither remedy was claimed at trial or in the intermediate appeal, and
neither
remedy is sought here. For that matter, the only remedy suggested is based on Appella nt's
assertion
that Judge Simpson erred in failing to remand the case back to the Magistrate Court to enter

Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or alternatively to have conducted a trial de novo, neither

of which

is likely to alter the disposition of this matter. See Appella nt's Brief at page 29. Addition
ally, the
remedy sought is not consistent with this Court's limited procedural options enunciated

in Losser,

supra.
In conclusion, substantial and competent evidence exists to support the magistr ate's finding
that the inventory was reasonable, and Judge Simpso n's decision therefore ought to be
affirmed.
Accounting.
We understand the accounting issues now before the Court may include some of the five
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issues raised by Jodi, John and Cindy in their Februar y 6, 2017, Objection to Final Accoun
ting and
Request for More Detailed Information. R. p. 69-71. !}lose five specific issues address
the
account ing generally, with specific reference to : (1) Key Bank account, (2) Rent Receive
d, (3)
Disburs ements, (4) Grazing Fees, and ( 5) Descrip tion of Charlie Bair rental agreement. R.

p. 69-70.

Judge Simpson addressed the accounting evidenc e presented to Magistrate Hansen in detail,
R. p. 236. The financial records consisting of 20 pages of documentation, included
all of the
account ing records maintai ned by Rodney, were attached to Vicki and Rodney 's Respons
e to
Objectio n for Final Accoun ting and Request for More Definite Information (R. p. 80-99),
and were
served on Appella nts on March 6, 2017 (R. p. 79), eleven days prior to the March 17, 201

7 hearing.

The trial examination of Rodney revealed several accounting errors: (1) He did not pay
the
$800 Key Bank loan as soon as he had funds available to do so; (2) He incurred late fees
by not
timely paying real estate taxes, (3) He incurred late fees by not timely paying property
insurance
premium s, and (4) He was unable to produce docume nts upon which he paid estate obligatio

ns with

his persona l credit card, and then reimbur sed himself for said payments. Rodney freely
admitted
those mistakes. Tr. 146, L. 10-p.147, L.10/40.
No evidenc e specifically addressed any alleged amount of monetar y damage the estate
suffered as a result; a rough review of those records results in a computation of roughly a

$100-200

loss. As an example only, the $800 Key Bank loan, which bore interest at 5.25% per annum
(see R.
p. 202) was paid on Decemb er 10, 2015 (R. p. 146, Exhibit A), approximately six months
after the
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estate had sufficient funds in hand to pay the obligation R. p. 139, (Exhibit A); annual interest
is
approximately $42.00 per year (800 x .0525), which computes to about $3 .50 per month. The
total
loss to the estate may have been about twenty one dollars.
Magistrate Hansen was not, and observed that he was not, presented with any further
evidence to assist him or to provide a basis to determine the dollar value of any alleged loss
to the
estate; the Magistrate recognized the amount involved, the time and expense of curing the
defects,
and recognizing the Uniform Probate Code including Idaho Code § 15--8--102 "give judges
plenary
power and wide discretion," he exercised his discretion. Tr. p. 299, L. 6--12/78. He acknow
ledged
"This is a situation where there's some rough edges on it, and because there's some rough edges,

it's

not perfect. The administration of the estate was not perfect, but it wasn't too bad either, given
what
you had to work with here," Tr. p. 3 00, L. 8--12/78. He concluded by approving the account
ing and
proposed distribution. Tr. p. 305, L.2-4/80.
Judge Hansen 's Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law were set forth orally on the record
at the conclusion of the March 27 th hearing. Tr. p. 292-306/76-80 and in writing in Judge Hansen
's
April 10, 2017 Order Regarding Final Accounting and Schedule of Distribution. Tr. p. 115-118
.
Judge Hansen 's "Judgment Ir' also included specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law. R.

p. 210--212.
Judge Simpson determined that "Cindy, Jodi and John have not shown error in Judge
Hansen 's Final Accounting Order." R. p. 238; the record supports his determination, and
Judge
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Simpso n's approval ofMagistrate Hansen 's determination the accounting was reasonable

should be

affirmed.

C.

Did the District Court err by applying an abuse of discretion standard fmding
that the Magistrate did not err by adopting the Personal Representatives
inventory and accounting and the reasonable sale of the property?

Weresp ectfully submitA ppellan tsmis-p erceive JudgeSi mpson's ruling. Simplystated, we
agree the "abuse of discretion" standard has no application to a trial court's findings of
fact. The
foregoing section dealing with the invento ry and accounting address the facts pertinen
t to those
issues in detail, and we won't re-address the factual determination; suffice it to say we disagree

that

Magistrate Hansen applied "discret ion" in determining his findings of fact. Judge Simpso
n's
decision doesn't address whether the Magistrate either had the authority to exercise discretio
findings of fact, or that the Magistrate had actually exercised any discretion when he found

n in its

the facts.

We distinguish "exercise of discretion" from a trial judge's obligation to determine the facts
when presented with conflicting evidence. The question is not whether discretion was properly
or
imprope rly exercised; the question when faced with conflicting evidence is whether
there is
substantial, competent evidence to support the court's findings of fact. In re Doe. 147 Idaho
243,
248,207 P.3d 974 (2009).
Addressing both the invento ry and accounting issues at the conclusion of the hearing,
Magistr ate's Hansen found "a situatio n where there's some rough edges ... but that it wasn't
too
bad, given what you had to work with ..." Tr. p. 300, L.18-12/78.
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Confronted with "rough edges," Magistrate Hansen's discretionary authority was called into
play when he decided what conclusions of law follow. He had to decide whether, under the
circumstances, the "rough edges" are serious enough to require part or all of the process to be
repeated, or alternatively, whether to put the matter to rest by approving the inventory and
accounting. This type of dilemma, routinely confronting trial courts, trigger the court's discretion,
and hence the issue of "abuse of discretion."
Magistrate Hansen approved both the accounting and proposed distribution, {Tr. p.305, L.24/80), which approvals we submit were conclusions oflaw, and which under the discretion granted
Magistrates under Idaho Code §§ 15-1-102 and 15-3-703 Magistrate Hansen had authority to
determine.

In the process Magistrate Hansen satisfied the requirements necessary for his exercise of
discretion. There are at least two guiding statutory principles of estate administration which provide
the Magistrate court with wide discretion:
15-1-102. Purposes-Rule of Construction.-{a) This Code shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underling purposes and policies. (b) The
underlying purposes and policies of this code are: (3) to promote a speedy and
efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to
his successors; .... (Emphasis added)
15-3-703. General duties-Relation and liability to persons interested in
estate-Standing to sue.-(a) .... A personal representative is under a duty to settle
and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated
and effective will and this code, and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent
with the best interests of the estate...." (Emphasis added).
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We next address the "speedy" and "efficient" statutory requirements set forth in the above
quoted sections of the Idaho Code.
Time.
To the extent Jodi, Cindy and John argue they had insufficient time to prepare or to present
their evidence, we note the hearing scheduled for February 6, 2017 was continued until March 27,
2017, in part to provide John with time to review the accounting documents. R. p. 104-105.
At about 11 :00 AM on the second day of the hearing, March 27, 2017, the Cpurt warned the
parties of limitations on the time available for the hearing, indicating the court had other matters at
3:30 PM, and therefore essentially ordering the parties to work through the noon hour. Tr. p. 150,
L. 3-5/41. At about 2:00 PM the court again warned the parties that he had only an hour and a half

to complete the hearing. Tr. p. 224, L. 3-6/59.
Magistrate Hansen expressed concern about the amount oftime required for more witnesses,
implying that adequate time had been provided to present evidence, much of which was wasted
through "a lot of questioning (which) was argumentative, second guessing, not real probative to
specific facts that were trying to be found." Tr. p. 303, L. 25-p. 304, L. 6/78.
Magistrate Hansen pointed out ways that Jodi, John and Cindy could have saved significant
court time by having independently verified assets of the estate, by obtaining a list of all titled
vehicles owned by the decedent through the State ofldaho, by independently subpoenaing records,
or by taking depositions of the Personal Representatives. Tr. p. 300, L. 23-p. 301, L. 13. The
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Magistrate pointed out that Jodi, John and Cindy could have called expert witness

es to establish the

value of the home. Tr. p. 300, L.15 top. 302, L. 19/78-79.
Expense.
Magistrate Hansen 's comments at the end of the initial hearing about replacing
Vicki as
Personal Representative indicate his concern about the potential expense of attorne

y fees diminishing

the small estate. Tr. p. 106, L. 23-p. l 15, L. 3/30. At the commencement of
the second hearing
Magistrate Hansen again expressed concern about the expense of administration

of the estate. Tr.

p. 122, L. 3-p.123, L.8/34. At the end of the hearing, Magistrate Hansen orally
set forth some of his
findings of fact and conclusions of law, setting forth the discretionary authority
as a basis for his thinking. Tr. p. 299, L. 6-12/78.

vested in his office

He first observed that most of the evidence

offered had been "nit picking." Tr. p. 292, L.8-13/7 6. He indicated the fees incurre
d for the hearing
probably consumed 10% of the value of the estate. Tr. p. 292, L. 14-17/7
6. The Magistrate
recognized his discretionary authority provided by the Uniform Probate Code.
Tr. p. 299, L. 612/78.
We submit Magistrate Hansen did not abuse his discretion under the standards
articulated
in Matter ofEstate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457, 480, 432 P .3d 6 (2018). He perceiv
ed his decision to
be a matter of discretion. Tr. p. 299, L. 6-12. He acted within the outer bounds
of that discretion,
which is provided by the Uniform Probate Code at Idaho Code§ § 15-1-102(a) and
(b) (3) and 15-3703. He acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to
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it, which includes the "speedy " and "efficient" administration estates, noting the evidence

had been

"nit picking" (Tr. p. 292, L. 8-13/76), the fees for one hearing had consumed 10% of the
value of
the estate (Tr. p. 299, L. 6-12/78) and that the estate was small. Tr. P. 141, L. 2-6/39.

Finally,

Magistrate Hansen ruled the case needed to be brought to an end, and therefore conclud
ed as a
matter oflaw "the Court will approve the final accounting, approve the proposed distribu

tion." Tr.

p. 305, L. 2-4/80.
Judge Simpso n's analysis of the evidence presented to Magistrate Hansen of his Decisio
n
and Order on Appeal (R. p. 236-239) is thorough and instructive. Judge Simpson determi
ned on
appeal there was sufficient evidence to support Magistrate Hansen 's findings regarding the

inventory

and accounting, and under the statutes directing and authorizing the magistrate to conduct
estate
administration efficiently and timely, decided Magistrate Hansen had reached his conclusi
ons oflaw
through an appropriate exercise ofhis discretion, balancing the necessary time and expense
required
to address and resolve the relatively minor inventory and accounting problems against the

efficiency

of a prompt resolution. Idaho Code§§ 15-1-102 and 15-3-703 each grant the probate magistra
te
broad discretionary authority to-conduct estate administration in an expeditious and efficient

manner.

Appellants cite Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275,985 P.2d 1137 (1999) and Rossignol
v.

State, 152 Idaho 700, 274 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012), for support of their proposition that the
District
Court on appeal "was required to apply either the De Novo standard of review to the law
or the
clearly erroneous standard of review to the facts." We respectfully submit neither cited case
stands
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for that proposition when applied in a probate case, and we further argue that proposition is

at best

a partial but incomplete statement of the law applicable to the District Court's review
of a
magistrate's decision in a non-criminal probate case.
Jodi, Cindy and John advance no argument under this section addressing the sale of the real
property, although the title of this section refers to the sale. Judge Simpson addressed the evidenc
e
regarding the sale ofthe real property (R. p. 248-251 ), concluding Magistrate Hansen 's decision
was
supported by substantial, competent evidence. Judge Simpso n's Order should be affirmed
with
respect to the sale of the real property, as well as the inventory and accounting issue addresse

d in this

section.
D.

Did the District Court err by excluding essential witnesses in the closing of the estate
that would have had an impact on the reasonable sale of the home, and the fees granted
on administration?

With respect to the sale of the home:
1.

The District Court excluded no witnesses; we assume Appellant's argument is that
the District Court erred by approving Magistrate Hansen alleged improper exclusion
of a witness. The record does not reflect Magistrate Hansen specifically excluded
any witness; we concede the Magistrate imposed time constraints on the hearing
which may have resulted in an inability to call Mark Call, the realtor, although we
note the record is devoid of any representation to the court that Jodi, Cindy or John
had through their attorney done anything prior to the trial to produce any evidence or
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to identify or prepare a witness to establish their position that the sale ofreal property
was somehow mis-managed. As Magistrate Hansen noted on the record, his ruling
was made in part because ofthe expense ofthe non-resident Personal Representatives
appearing in Idaho another day for a hearing, in part because of a poor use ofthe time
which had been allotted to the hearing, in part because of a failure to articulate what
credible evidence a specific witness would offer with respect to either the value of
the real property or the sale of the home, and in part by failing to identify or preserve
testimony through either a deposition or subpoena of a witness to be able to provide
evidence as to the reasons why the real property sold for less than the appraisal price.
2.

We contend the Magistrate has discretionary authority to control the time allotted for
a hearing. Idaho Code§ 15-1-102(a) and (b)(2) provides for "speedy and efficient"
administration of estates, Idaho Code § 15-3-703 requires a personal representative
to administer estates "expeditiously and efficiently," Idaho Rule of Evidence I. R. E.
102 provides that

"These rules should be construed as to administer every

proceeging fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, .... " I.R.E. 403 allows
a court to exclude relevant evidence ifits probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of ... undue delay, .... " I.R.E. 611 (a)(2) provides, in material part:
"The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: ... (2) avoid wasting time." . . . . See

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 37

also Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 338 P. 3d 1220 (2014), for a trial court's
authority to limit witnesses.
3.

Time was given, ( Tr. p. 150, L. 3-5/41; Tr. p. 224, L. 3/59; Tr. p. 303, L. 1-21/79),
but the magistrate observed the time was not well used. Tr. p. 303, L. 1-p. 304, L.
12/79.

4.

The magistrate also observed that with respect to the sale of the home, potential
witnesses were not subpoenaed, and evidence was not preserved by way of
deposition, Tr. p. 300, L. 15-p. 302, L. 25/78.

5.

The magistrate observe d that a number of steps which could have been taken to
address the allegedly faulty sale of the real property, none of which was done. Tr.
p. 301, L. 20- p. 302, L. 19/78.

With respect to the sale of the real property:
Although the sale price of the real property was less than the appraisal, no admissible
evidence was submitted in the trial court to explain or support why the sale price was less
or the
extent to which the estate was damaged, and no admissible evidence was offered or
admitted
regarding the reason why any one of the three prospective purchasers who had made offers

(Tr. p.

188, L. 1-9/50) did not pursue the purchas e of the property. The only "evidence" offered
was John
White, Jr. 's statement that he was told by a loan agent that his loan application was denied
because
the mobile home on the property did not qualify for a FHA loan. Tr. p. 199, L. 21- p. 200,
L. 4.
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There are numerous potential explanations as to why Mr. White did not complete the loan
process and purchase the home. He may have simply decided not to go through with the loan
process, as it is common for "offers" on real property to be made "contingent on financing," which
is nothing more than a prospective purchaser's method to obtain additional time to determine
whether he or she really wants to purchase the property.
A second major fact not addressed is whether or not Mr. White personally (not the property)
had acceptable credit for loan approval. No evidence was offered that Mr. White would have
qualified for a loan, and it is understandable for a loan agent to have justified denial of a loan with
an explanation that the property did not qualify for a loan, rather than potentially insulting the
applicant by explaining the loan request denial was based on a failure of applicant's credit
worthiness.
With respect to the property itself, was the loan application for just the mobile home and
addition, or was it for the entire twelve acre parcel? Would the mobile home have qualified for the
loan if it had been attached to the personal property? Are there zoning rules applicable to the
"attachment" to the real property, and if so, did the alluded to "attachment" meet those requirements?
Did the mobile home have aluminum rather than copper wiring? Was the mobile home too old to
be financed?
Even if these questions could be answered, what financing costs would have been required,
reducing the actual payment to the estate? Would repairs to the home have been a prerequisite of
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financing, which would reduce any claim for damages based on the difference between the appraisal
price and the actual sale price?
Jodi, Cindy and John persist in presentin g the "sale of real estate/exclusion of witnesses "
argument notwithstanding the fact that although they had multiple methods of preparing and
presentin g admissible evidence regarding the sale of the real estate, they availed themselves of none
of those methods. Magistrate Hansen was faced with little alternative other than concludin g the
hearing, and he articulated his dilemma, and decision. Judge Simpson determined the appeal of that
decision was unreasonable and without foundation; the argument here has not changed, and therefore
Jodi, Cindy and John ought to expect the same result for their real estate sale/exclusion of witness
argument.
With respect to the fees on administration:
It is unclear whether the objection addresses Personal Representatives' fees or attorney's fees.
The Personal Representative offered Exhibit C, which identifies the basis for the claimed personal
representative fees. Tr. p. 265, L. 2-p. 266, L. 14./70. No questions were asked and no evidence was
offered questioni ng the entries on Exhibit C, although Judge Simpson remanded the issue to the
Magistrate Court not for lack of evidence, but for entry of findings of fact and conclusions law to
determin e the reasonableness of the Personal Representatives' fees, but not the attorney's fees. R.
p. 256,258. There is no indication in the record or on appeal that attorney's fees incurred prior to
the appeal are an issue.
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Jodi, Cindy and John made no indication on the record through their attorney or otherwi

se

they had identified or were prepared to call an additional, allegedly excluded, witness
to address
personal representative's fees. They did refer in the record to Mark Call, the realtor who
handled
the sale of the home, and Charlie Bair, the person who resided in the home and then purchas

ed the

property, as potential witnesses. Tr. p. 291, L. 15-p. 292, L. 7. There is nothing in the record
that
either one of those witnesses would have, or could have offered testimony about the
personal
representatives' fees.
Magistrate Hansen recognized the discretion afforded him under the Uniform Probate Code
and the Idaho Rules of Evidence 102,403 and 61 l(a)(2), which grant him discretion to control,
or
limit, the time allotted for the admissi on of evidence. Tr. p. 299, L. 6-12/78. Magistrate
Hansen
recognized the issues were are not substantial. Tr. p. 299, L. 23-p. 300, L. 7/78. Attorne
y Blaser
acknowledged the estate was small. Tr. p. 8, L. 3/5, and also recognized travel expense
s were
substantial as at the commen cement of the case he acknowledged plane travel expenses
of$1300 1400 per trip. Tr. p. 7, L. 25/5. Magistrate Hansen recognized the estate was small, which
was a
factor in his ruling. Tr. p. 8, L. 3/5.
Magistrate Hansen concluded with a rational weighing of the relative importance of the
issues before him: "This is a situation where there's some rough edges on it, and because
there's
some rough edges, it's not perfect. The administration ofthe estate was not perfect, but it wasn't
too
bad either, given what you had to work with here." Tr. p. 300, L. 8-12/78. Magistrate
Hansen
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concluded the exercise of his discretion by expressing the conclusion
oflaw : "Cour t will approve
the final accounting, approve the proposed distribution," Tr. p. 305,
L. 2-4/80, referring to the
proposed distribution set forth in the Petition for Order Appro
ving: Final Settlement and
Distribution. R. p. 55--61.
We respectfully contend the Appellants have neither shown any basis for

relief nor have they

requested an appropriate remedy with respect to the sale of the real
estate. Judge Simps on's
Decision and Order on Appeal should be affirmed.
E.

Did the District Court err by granting counsel fees on appeal pursu
ant to Idaho Code
12 ... 121?
Attorn ey's fees for Estate administration before the Magistrate. Idaho
Code § 15-3--720

provides Personal Representatives the right to receive from the estate

their necessary expenses and

disbursements, including attorney fees incurred, which in effect means
that each of the devisees
share in that expense on a pro rata basis. While any party has the right
to contest the reasonableness
of the attorneys' fees (Idaho Code§ 15-3--721), that issue was not challe
nged in the Magis trate's
Division or in the appeal to the District Court and therefore is not before
We identify this issue to distinguish the fees heretofore charged and to be

the Court on this appeal.

incurred for administration

of the estate to be paid by the estate pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-702
from the fee shifting issues
which are before the court under Idaho Code § 12-121.
Attorney's Fees incurred for the District Court appeal.
The attorney fee issue before the District Court in the intermediate appeal
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was not whether

the Estate was obliga ted to pay Vicki and Rodne y's attorn eys' fees
incurr ed in the appeal to the
Distric t Court, but rather wheth er the Distric t Court should shift the obliga

tion to pay estate attorney

fees incurred in that appeal from the Estate to Jodi, John and Cindy
.
In the appeal to the Distric t Court Vicki and Rodne y claime d attorne
appeal identifying both Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Code § 15-8-2

y fees incurred for the

08(1 )(b) in their Respo ndent' s

brief. R. p. 176-177. Distric t Judge Simps on appare ntly overlo oked
the claim, probably becau

se the

claim was set forth in the middl e of the brief, rather than at the end
as is usually done, and he
therefore initially denied Vicki and Rodne y's claim. See R. p. 257.
Vicki and Rodne y immed iately filed a Petitio n for Re-He aring to addres

s the narrow attorn ey

fee issue, R. p. 260-263, as a result of which the Distric t Court revers
ed its decision and award

ed

Respo ndent' s fees (R. p. 287-2 89) pursua nt to Idaho Code§ 12-121
, the District Court conclu ding
"this Court is left with the firm belief that Cindy, Jody, and John brough
t this appeal frivolously,
unreasonably, and withou t founda tion." R. p. 289.
Standa rd of review.
The standa rd of review of an award of attorne y fees award ed by the
intermediate district
court was set forth in Brown v. Brown, No. 46926 (2020) 670, 676:
Idaho Code § 12-121 author izes an award of attorn ey fees to a prevai
ling party when
the 'case was broug ht or defend ed frivolously, unreas onably or withou
t foundation.'
I. C. § 12-121. An award of attorney fees is review ed for abuse of discretion.
Matter
ofEstate ofBirch 164 Idaho 631,6 33,43 4 P.3d 806,8 08 (2019).
The court then cited the abuse of discretion test articulated in Lunne
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borg, supra at 863.

Judge Simpso n's award of fees is a logical extension of the observations in his

lengthy brief,

which point out an absence of factual eviden ce to support the Appell ant's
arguments, and the
absenc e of any questions of law raised in the Magist rate's court.
At R. p. 227 Judge Simpso n recognizes the discretion granted to the magistrate
in probate
cases, the exercise of which Judge Simpso n is required to evaluate when he conside

rs the arguments

presen ted to him on appeal. He recognized the standards required when discret
ion is exercised. At

R. p. 228 Judge Simpson acknowledges the requirement that specific statutory authori

ty is required

to lay the basis for a claim for attorney fees.
At R. p. 230 he points out the lack of action taken by Jodi, Cindy and John to
question the
invento ry for a year and half after person ally participating in not only the prepara
tion Qf the lists
compri sing the ultimate inventory, but also participating in the division of those

assets. He points

out that after waiting 18 months to object, they were given additional time, anothe
Februa ry 6th to March 27th, 2017 to prepare evidence, and then recites the testimo

r six weeks, from

ny at R. p. 231-235,

politel y pointin g out that the quality of eviden ce offered was essentially meanin
gless in assisting
Magist rate Hansen to reach a decision. At R. J?· 236 Judge Simpso n points
out that no effort was
made to alert the court to a specifi c problem or to seek removal of the Person
al Representatives for
any breach of a fiduciary duty. He then points out the issue as to the timelin
ess of the distribution
of the invento ry was raised for the first time on appeal, and therefore was summa
procee ds to point out that the allegations of breach of a fiduciary duty were
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rily dismissed. He

also presented for the

first time on appeal, and therefore those claims were also summar ily dismissed.
At R. p. 241-242, he points to the inadequ acy of the proof pertaining to items left off
the
inventory, as all were involved in the prepara tion of the lists of items to be disposed of by
auction.
At R. p. 242-243, Judge Simpson points out Magistrate Hansen 's solicitation for clarity
as to what
issues he was being asked to address, but that he received no meaningful response. At
R. p. 246
Judge Simpso n points out the reasons not only why Magistr ate Hansen limited the testimon
also points out cogently why, given neither evidenc e nor an offer of proof as to what the

y, but

additional

real estate sale evidence might be, he had no basis to weigh what probative evidence might

be, and

had little alternative but to conclude the hearing.
Given the extent ofJudge Simpso n's critical analysis of the evidence submitted, accentuated
by two extensiv e actual quotations of the type of "eviden ce" offered, Judge Simpson
has
demonstrated the basis for his "firm belief' that Jodi, Cindy and John's appeal was
brought
"frivolously, unreaso nably and without foundation" as provide d by Idaho Code§ 12-121.
Judge
Simpso n did not abuse his discretion, and his decision awardin g Vicki and John attorney

fees on the

appeal to the District Court ought to be affirmed on appeal.
While we recognize Judge Simpso n's decision is not binding on this court, In re Doe, 147
Idaho 243, 248, 207 P.3d 974 (2009), the Suprem e Court does review his decision, as
well as the
Magistr ate's Finding s of Pact and Conclusions of Law. Doe, supra at 248.
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CONCLUSION

We respectfully suggest the Supreme court should:
1.

With respect to the issues presented to District Judge Simpson in the intermediate appeal,
affirm his decision under the authority of Losser, supra. Those issues include Judge
Simpson's approval of Magistrate Hansen:
a.

Approving the Personal Representatives' Inventory and Accounting.

b.

Excluding witnesses

c.

Concluding the sale of real property was reasonable

d.

Concluding management of the real property prior to sale was reasonable

e.

Concluding the conduct of family auction was reasonable

f.

Remanding of Personal Representatives' fees issue to Magistrate for entry of
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law

2.

With respect to the issue of attorney's fees on the appeal from the magistrate to the District
Court, affirm Judge Simpson's decision under Idaho Code§ 12-121 awarding Vicki and
Rodney attorney's fees against Jodi, Cindy and John, to be charged against their share of the
estate.

3.

With respect to the Vicki and Rodney's claim for attorneys' fees on this appeal to the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, award them attorney's fees, to be charged
against the estate interest of Jodi, Cindy and John.
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